


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DAN SMOOT

COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

In January, 1957 (after the Eisenhower Administration revealed that it had invited Tito of Yugoslavia to visit the United States), Congress formally registered stern disapproval: neither Congress nor the people considered Tito a proper guest for this country, because of his association with the crimes of Nikita Khrushchev.

In 1959 — without letting Congress or the people know, until it was too late for protests to be effective — Eisenhower invited the chief hangman himself to visit America.

Shortly after his triumphal tour of America, Khrushchev visited communist China. In Peiping, Khrushchev told Chinese communist leaders:

"If enough people follow Eisenhower, we will get what we want, over a great deal of opposition from some quarters. He is most discreet and does not bring up unpleasant subjects like some of the American warmongers."

Seven months later — May, 1960 — Khrushchev at Paris turned on his 'discreet' friend, the President, saying he was not a proper guest for the Soviet Union, calling him names, humiliating him and America in the eyes of the world.

Khrushchev's henchmen in China and Japan immediately pressed the advantage which international communism had gained in its campaign to disgrace America. The communist party in China poured money into Japan to finance demonstrations against Eisenhower's proposed "good-will" trip to Japan.

As if hypnotized, or dazed by their stunning defeats, Eisenhower and his policy makers and all their internationalist supporters, both Democrat and Republican, in Congress and out, insisted that Eisenhower *had to go* to Japan: his trip was *necessary* to American prestige.

The communist riots in Japan became increasingly bloody and sinister.

On Sunday, June 12, 1960, when President Eisenhower departed from Washington for the far east, he was asked about the possibility of cancelling his visit to Japan: rioting in Tokyo was, by

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then, dangerously out of control. The President said bluntly that he was going to Japan — that he would not be stopped by "hostile agents."

On June 17, (June 17 in the far east; June 16 in the west) communist leaders in Tokyo said 300,000 would be mobilized for 'demonstrations' on Saturday, June 18, to protest Eisenhower's scheduled arrival the next day. The Prime Minister of Japan (Nobusuke Kishi) acceded to the communists' demands: He cancelled President Eisenhower's visit.

News of the cancellation was released to the world hours before the President himself knew about it. He received the news (with "surprise" and "dismay") while reviewing a parade in Manila. James Hagerty (the President's Press Secretary) admitted that President Eisenhower had been given no forewarning of the cancellation and knew nothing about it until he heard about the newspaper account.

On June 17, 1960, the President left the Philippines, sailing under severe military alert intended to protect him from the Chinese communists. He headed for Formosa, despite the heavy communist bombardment of Quemoy (which his "good-will" visit prompted), while the western world expressed alarm and the communist world gloated.

The *New York Times* news service, in a dispatch from Hong Kong said:

"Although the United States' loss of face in the Far East as a result of the cancellation of Eisenhower's trip to Japan will be enormous, observers here believe that it will be relatively insignificant compared with the prestige red China will gain, not only in the uncommitted countries of Asia, but also in communist parties — legal and underground — throughout the world."

The Soviet newspaper, *Izvestia*, said:

"The events of these days should have proved to Eisenhower, even if he is blind and deaf, that the Japanese do not wish to see him on their soil, that he is not only an unwanted guest, but he

is like a man who forcibly wants to break into another man's home."

A United Press International dispatch from London said:

"There was deep concern in western diplomatic circles over the effect of the cancellation, on Eisenhower's personal prestige and that of the United States, and, consequently, the entire western world."

An Associated Press story from Washington said:

"Official Washington Thursday viewed as a diplomatic catastrophe the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan.

"The event — and the forces which brought it about — threaten the future of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

"The northern anchor of the allied security system in the Far East is thus endangered.

"At the moment, it's anybody's guess where Japan will stand in the cold war, once the current upheaval is over. . . .

"Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and the chieftains of red China won a stunning victory in their cold war campaign to cut down U.S. prestige and destroy the system of alliances and foreign bases which constitute the free world's forward defenses against Soviet-Chinese communist power."

Thus, the crashing collapse of American foreign policy was evident to the world. Indeed, that collapse has been evident for several years. The events of May and June, 1960, merely compelled every one to admit it.

The 'National Purpose'

For many months — indeed, years — internationalist leaders of America (who fabricated and supported the American foreign policy which now lies in shameful ruins) have been anticipating the need to shore up this policy by pretending to change it: They have been talking about the "crisis in American foreign policy," bemoaning the fact that our policy reflects no clear "National Pur-

pose," insisting that we must work out a new policy, and offering their suggestions.

When you analyze them, however, you find that none of their recommended "new policies" are new. They are merely recommendations for more of the same policy.

Life and the Times

In May, 1960, *Life* magazine pompously announced that it, in conjunction with *The New York Times*, was initiating a series of articles to discuss "The National Purpose: what we as citizens and as a nation wish and hope to achieve." *Life* said that discussions of our "National Purpose," (which promise to become "the most crucial debate of our generation") have sometimes (before *Life* took over, that is) produced "only earnest confusion or empty declamation."

Life's initial article on the National Purpose was written by John K. Jessup, chief editor. Mr. Jessup's article is modestly entitled "A Noble Framework for a Great Debate."

On May 23, 1960, U. S. Senator William Proxmire (extreme leftwing Democrat from Wisconsin) put Mr. Jessup's "A Noble Framework for a Great Debate" in the *Congressional Record*. Senator Proxmire was unrestrained in his enthusiasm for the article—and for the entire *Life-New York Times* project of presenting a series of articles which would give the final word on America's National Purpose.

John K. Jessup's initial *Life* article on the National Purpose (reprinted in *The New York Times* on May 19, 1960) is amazing. When talking about what America's National Purpose *used to be*, Jessup says some brilliant things, such as:

"During most of its brief history, America has been bursting with confidence in its own unlimited destiny."

"Our national mission was to exemplify the success of free self-government, to let our democratic light so shine before men that they could see its good works and become democrats too. Many did, including most of Europe."

"The wisdom of the Founding Fathers in making the free individual the cornerstone of our institutions was proved by his accomplishments. The individual was especially credited with our economic feats and therefore not begrudged his unequal rewards through the free enterprise system. He was the agent of that conquest of poverty which America had anticipated since colonial times."

"The land has been an inestimable stimulus to effort and to wealth, but the system that enabled every man to take up his pursuit of wealth and happiness has been the most valued part of the whole."

Mr. Jessup never explains why the great purposes (which created America and enabled it to grow into the greatest nation in history) are no longer suitable for our times. He indicates that we do not have a National Purpose anymore and that this worries great intellectuals like Walter Lippmann and William Faulkner. Jessup says that even President Eisenhower seems concerned about the absence of a National Purpose:

"As though he also felt something missing, the President himself has appointed a Commission on National Goals 'to develop a broad outline of national objectives and programs for the next decade and longer.'"

But John K. Jessup, chief editor of *Life*, does not say what he thinks our National Purpose should now be, except to hint (with the same "earnest confusion" that *Life* complains of in others) that we should perhaps develop some kind of 'world law.'

Deep Human Wisdom

On May 20, 1960, Senator George D. Aiken (leftwing Republican from Vermont) spoke to the World Affairs Council in Boston, recommending "A Foreign Policy for the 1960's." Senator Mike Mansfield (leftwing Democrat from Montana) put Senator Aiken's speech in the *Congressional Record*—touting it as "an excellent statement" by a Senator with "deep human wisdom"

and "sound grasp of world affairs" who is an "exceptional leader."

In his Boston speech, Senator Aiken said:

"... (There) seems to be a trend (in the Soviet Union) in the direction of greater conservatism. This is hopeful and should be encouraged by whatever means are at hand. These means . . . include such things as reasonable trade in non-strategic goods and greater travel by westerners to the Soviet Union and by Russians to the west . . . by every means at our command we must strive to convey to the Russian people the fact that we are fully desirous of continuing our efforts to promote a franker and more peaceful understanding between us

"Beyond the Soviet Union . . . lies communist China, a restless, growing giant. At some point during the 1960's we shall have to adjust our foreign policy to take account of this fact. We shall have to put behind us the passions of 10 years ago and discuss it calmly I am not suggesting that we recognize communist China day after tomorrow, or that we withdraw our opposition to seating communist China in the United Nations. In fact, it would not be the part of wisdom to do either I am simply recommending that we consider, dispassionately, communist China's place in the world and our relationship to it

"The Chinese communist regime . . . will have to be reckoned with sooner or later, and we will be better off for doing it sooner rather than later.

"One of the interesting possibilities involved in a possible disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union is that any inspection system would have to include communist China. This might provide an opening wedge to change the basis of United States-Chinese relations

"The essential point is that, in making our foreign policy for the 1960's, we have got to accommodate it to the facts of life in the world — to the nationalism of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to the industrial power of the Soviet Union, and to the growing power of communist China

"We might as well resign ourselves to the fact that all of this is going to require a considerable national effort and is going to cost substantial sums of money. Our taxes may go up."

This is a new policy?

Dr. Morgenthau

Of all the "new foreign policy" pronouncements made during the past two years, (when internationalists have tried to prepare for an enlargement and continuation of our present policy, by showing how disastrously wrong this policy is) the most remarkable was made by Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau. Dr. Morgenthau is among the crowd of American 'intellectuals' who, practically unknown to the public, has an immense influence on the affairs of our nation because of his 'correct' credentials. Dr. Morgenthau (presently on leave from his chair as professor of political science at the University of Chicago) is a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey, and an associate of the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research.

He made a speech on "The Crisis of American Foreign Policy" at the University of Connecticut on George Washington's birthday—February 22, 1960.

On May 23, 1960, after the humiliating incident of Khrushchev sending Eisenhower packing from Paris (which revealed to the world that there was indeed a crisis in American foreign policy), U. S. Congressman Chester Bowles (extreme left-wing Democrat from Connecticut) put Dr. Morgenthau's speech in the *Congressional Record*.

Dr. Morgenthau says that, traditionally, America,

"following the advice which Washington had given in his Farewell Address would not think of being permanently involved in the affairs of Europe."

And then,

"... formulation of a new American foreign policy was accomplished in the spring of 1947 in what has been called 'The 15 Weeks.' Within those weeks, a radical change occurred in the foreign policy of the United States. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan are the landmarks of that radical transformation. Through those instruments of foreign policy, the United States acknowledged, almost as a matter of course,

its permanent involvement in the affairs of the world. The frontiers of the United States were no longer drawn at the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere. . . .

"The policy of containment (the Truman Doctrine) was the most spectacular expression of this new policy. It implied the permanent stationing of American troops and the permanent commitment of American resources around the perimeter of the Soviet empire. The Marshall plan (first name for foreign aid) . . . implied a permanent and active involvement of the United States in the affairs of the world in an even more intimate way. The United States now recognized its responsibility to help other nations which were threatened with economic disaster"

Was all this good? Dr. Morgenthau is ecstatic about it:

"Those were the classic, the heroic days of the new American policy . . . it is still . . . an occasion for wonderment and also of admiration how quickly the United States adapted itself to new circumstances; how thoroughly it divorced itself from a tradition which had been hallowed by the whole historic development of the United States and by the authority of its greatest early statesmen"

Dr. Morgenthau makes the extraordinary claim that the Policy of Containment was entirely successful — that is, it completely stopped Soviet aggression at "the line of military demarcation which was established in 1945"! The Soviets have not formally incorporated any new nations into the Soviet Union; and Dr. Morgenthau ignores the tier of European states which the Soviets have conquered since we adopted the policy of containment — conquered by overturning the legitimate governments through internal subversion and setting up puppet governments which take orders from the Kremlin.

Dr. Morgenthau presents some examples of what he calls "the counterproductivity of the policy of containment and of alliances." By *counterproductivity* he means *undesirable* results. He says:

"We have an alliance with Pakistan. It is difficult . . . to know against whom this alliance could possibly be directed, except against India.

But obviously we have no interest in supporting Pakistan against India. While we support Pakistan against some imaginary enemy, we force India to divert a considerable amount of its resources to military purposes in order to match the military preparations of Pakistan. Since, of course, we realize that India is infinitely more important than Pakistan in terms of the overall world situation, we must support India in order to make up the difference between its resources available for economic development and those which have been diverted for military purposes.

"So we are really engaged in an armaments race with ourselves. With the left hand, we support Pakistan militarily, while with the right hand, we support India economically in order to help her bear up under the weight of the armaments which our support of Pakistan has forced upon her.

"We have been led to this disregard of our own interest by what amounts to a kind of obsession with military alliances. The Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower doctrine, and more particularly SEATO — The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization — were all what one might call open-ended alliances . . . based on unilateral declarations on the part of the United States, inviting whoever wanted to join to come in and join. Of necessity, the nations which joined did so not on behalf of the interests of the United States, but on behalf of their own interests.

"I remember vividly a discussion I had a couple of years ago with the Foreign Minister of one of our allies about the American alliance. He made no bones about the fact that for him the main purpose of the American alliance was to establish a special claim for his country upon the American treasury

"Quite a number of our allies have turned out to be handicaps for the United States in political as well as in financial terms. They have been able to dictate to the United States the policies we are supposed to pursue with regard to them. Where they have not been able to do that, they have, in many instances, been able to impose a veto upon the foreign policies of the United States Wherever there is need for a new departure, there is also an ally pulling at our coattails and saying: 'No. If you want to keep me as your ally, you can't do that.' . . .

"We have embarked upon a rather expensive program of foreign aid, most of which goes into the military support of our allies. What is genu-

ine economic and technological aid in our foreign aid policy is based upon . . . (an) oversimplified philosophy which assumes that . . . the infusion of foreign money and foreign know-how . . . somehow will transform a backward . . . society into a rational, modern, industrial one, and a society thus transformed will become stable, democratic, and peaceful as well . . .

"(The) soundness (of these assumptions) appears to be very much open to doubt. Successful foreign aid, infused into a primitive society, is, by the very nature of its success, a revolutionary and disruptive element, not at all a factor making for social stability. This being so . . . it may well be considered a blessing in disguise that in many countries our policy of foreign aid has not been successful; for, had it been, it might well have undermined the very status quo to whose support we are committed."

Thus, Dr. Morgenthau makes a strong case against foreign aid and against our whole system of multiple permanent alliances with foreign nations.

But does he suggest that we abandon these programs and return to the traditional policy which made America a great nation, a policy which he himself says "had been hallowed by the whole historic development of the United States and by the authority of its greatest early statesmen"?

No! Dr. Morgenthau wants us to continue the same *kind* of wrong foreign policy we now have, but wants us to handle it the way the Soviets handle theirs!

He says:

"When we speak of foreign trade, we refer to commercial transactions engaged in by private enterprises or individuals with other private enterprises or individuals for private gain . . . For the Soviet Union, foreign trade is a political matter of the first order . . . it is another arm of Russian foreign policy. The Soviet Union engages in foreign trade not for the purpose of private gain, but for the purpose of public gain; that is to say, for the purpose of increasing the power of the Soviet state . . .

"Against this all-out drive—which uses foreign trade as a political weapon—is it sufficient for us to respond with 'business as usual'? . . . Or is

it not necessary for us to realize, as we have realized in other fields of economic activity, that there are certain segments of the economic sphere which are affected by the public interest and which, therefore, must be controlled and regulated by the public power? . . .

"Our conception of foreign aid (is) as a technically self-sufficient undertaking, divorced from political purposes . . . The Russians have an entirely different, political conception of foreign aid . . . They don't ask, as it were, 'What is necessary for your happiness or your economic and social development?' They ask, first of all, 'What is to our advantage? What can we give you to pull you over to our side?' . . .

"This political orientation which permeates the foreign aid policy of the Soviet Union, as it does Russian foreign policy in all its manifestations, is lacking in ours. We debate every year the question, How much ought we to spend for foreign aid in view of the budget? instead of asking the really relevant question, What kind of foreign aid policy ought we to have in view of our political interests? . . . We ought to appropriate whatever money is necessary to implement the policy of foreign aid which serves the over-all purposes of our foreign policy."

Freedom or Dictatorship

All our internationalist 'thinkers' are bankrupt of ideas, because all their thought is based on the bankrupt presumption that basic principles, which are at the bedrock of our national greatness, are now outmoded.

The basic principle of our society is that government has no power except what the people give it, the people having received their rights as a gift from God.

The constitutional role of our federal government is *negative*, not positive. The government is not supposed to *do things* for the people: It is supposed to restrain us from harming or defrauding each other so that we can do things for ourselves.

With regard to foreign policy, our government has no constitutional right or power (or even excuse) to 'lead' or manage the world. The Ameri-

can government was created to "secure the blessings of liberty to *ourselves* and *our* posterity." The only legitimate role for the federal government in foreign affairs is to protect the rights and interests of the American people against foreign powers.

The National Purpose of America should be exactly what it was during the first 125 years of our national life: to stand as proof that free men can govern themselves. It is not our role to bribe or bludgeon — or even persuade — other people to follow our example. Our national destiny was — and still should be — to blaze a trail toward freedom, a trail which all people, if they wish, can follow or guide themselves by, without any meddling from us.

Leading internationalists today admit that this used to be the noble National Purpose of America, but they presume that we can never return to that purpose. Why? Hydrogen bombs and airplanes and intercontinental ballistic missiles do not change basic principles. The principles on which our nation was founded are as valid now as they were in the 18th century.

Indeed, the very developments in science which have made the world 'shrink' and have frightened internationalists into abandoning our original national principles, are precisely the developments which should make us cling to those principles. If foreign enemies can now destroy our nation by pressing a button, it seems obvious that our *total* defense effort should be devoted to *protecting our nation* against such an attack: it is suicidal for us to waste any of our defense effort on "economic improvement" and military assistance for other nations.

The fact is that our 'foreign friends' would be better off without our aid. Our economic aid disrupts their own economy and subsidizes the socialistic programs of their governments, making it impossible for the people ever to develop institutions of freedom comparable to what we once had. Our military aid is something they feel they have to take — in order to get economic aid from us, and to keep up militarily with rival nations to whom we are also giving military aid.

Our foreign aid not only puts us in the ridiculous position of engaging in an armaments race with ourselves: it puts all of our 'allies' into an armaments race with each other.

Dr. Hans Morgenthau's recommendations for a 'new foreign policy' make more sense than any other contemporary pronouncements by our internationalists. Dr. Morgenthau does not really recommend a new policy. He recommends that we keep our present policy of trying to bribe and manage the world, but that we operate it the way the Soviets operate their policy.

If we want our governmental leaders to continue playing the age-old imperialistic game of international power politics, we *must* do this: we must surrender our individual rights and constitutional principles so that our leaders can play the game effectively.

A free and independent republic can not be a "world leader" in the sense that our internationalists mean, because it is handicapped by its own traditions and institutions of freedom.

Only dictatorships have enough power over their own people to operate quickly and freely in the arena of international power politics. Our government is not designed to have that much power.

When the American government becomes an absolute dictatorship, it can compete, in the fields of propaganda and power politics, with other absolute dictatorships. Until then, the dictatorships will always defeat our government in the dictatorship-activities that our government has no right to be involved in anyway.

Hence, we Americans must decide whether we want to restore America as a free and independent republic, or whether we should abandon all such pretense and accept dictatorship.

As a nation, we must either climb back up that steep and hazardous cliff to the plateau of freedom which we abandoned — or we must go all the way down into the abyss of slavery.

Our federal government, trying to operate on the international stage (and at home, too) as a dictatorship, is hamstrung by the traditions and trappings of freedom — by the pressures and agitation of citizens who still want freedom, and by the controls of a Congress which still has patriots in it.

As long as there are constitutionalists—writing and broadcasting, or in the Congress, or writing letters to Washington officials, or running important businesses, or voting at the polls — our leaders cannot have a free hand to play the game of dictatorship. Our leaders — competing with dictators who have the power to make sudden and arbitrary decisions—will continue to lead us from shameful defeat to more shameful defeat until America is destroyed.

Americans must make a choice: we must silence the clamorous few who keep alive the remnants of freedom so that our President can become a dictator and compete effectively in the fields of propaganda and power politics with other dictators — or, we must strictly prohibit our government from all such activity, so that freedom will have a chance.

We can't stay in the middle of the road: that's where people get killed.

My choice is for freedom.

A free people will outpace slaves in every important field. If our government were restricted (as was originally intended) to constitutional functions (enforcing justice and defending the nation against foreign enemies) our national accomplishments, in every important activity imaginable, would be so infinitely greater than that of the Soviets that only psychopaths and fools would be troubled about "growing Soviet strength."

Our internationalists say that the events of World War II, and after, catapulted America into a position of world-leadership and that, if we don't lead, the world will go to ruin, dragging us down with it. The truth is that our internationalist policies of world-meddling have made America, not the world leader, but the world's whipping boy.

I would like to restore America to the kind of world leadership that was ours during the first 125 years of our national life, when we led the world toward the ideal of liberty for all humanity, not by meddling in foreign affairs, but by keeping our government out of the affairs of other nations, while leaving our people free to build institutions of freedom and to conduct their own friendly relations with other peoples.

* * * * *

WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Dan Smoot was born in Missouri. Reared in Texas, he attended SMU in Dallas, taking BA and MA degrees from that university in 1938 and 1940.

In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow in English, doing graduate work for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of American Civilization.

In 1942, he took leave of absence from Harvard in order to join the FBI. At the close of the war, he stayed in the FBI, rather than return to Harvard.

He served as an FBI Agent in all parts of the nation, handling all kinds of assignments. But for three and a half years, he worked exclusively on communist investigations in the industrial midwest. For two years following that, he was on FBI headquarters staff in Washington, as an Administrative Assistant to J. Edgar Hoover.

After nine and a half years in the FBI, Smoot resigned to help start the Facts Forum movement in Dallas. As the radio and television commentator for Facts Forum, Smoot, for almost four years spoke to a national audience giving both sides of great controversial issues.

In July, 1955, he resigned and started his own independent program, in order to give only one side — the side that uses fundamental American principles as a yardstick for measuring all important issues.

If you believe that Dan Smoot is providing effective tools for those who want to think and talk and write on the side of freedom, you can help immensely by subscribing, and encouraging others to subscribe, to *The Dan Smoot Report*.